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Abstract
Deep Learning (DL) has been shown to be particu-
larly vulnerable to adversarial samples. To combat ad-
versarial strategies, numerous defenses have been pro-
posed in the literature. Among these, feature squeezing
emerges as an effective defense by reducing unnecessary
features without changing the DL model. However, fea-
ture squeezing is a deterministic process: as soon as
an adversarial sample is found, this sample will always
succeed against the classifier.
In this work, we address this problem and introduce
Mix’n’Squeeze, a randomized feature squeezing defense
that leverages key-based randomness to harden secu-
rity against adversarial samples. Our defense consists of
pre-processing the classifier inputs by embedding care-
fully selected randomness within each feature, before
applying feature squeezing, so that an attacker can no
longer predict the effect of their own perturbations on
the resulting sample. We thoroughly implement and
evaluate Mix’n’Squeeze in the context of image classi-
fication in light of various reported strategies to gen-
erate adversarial samples. We also analyze the re-
silience of Mix’n’Squeeze with respect to state of the
art graybox and blackbox attacks. Our results show
that Mix’n’Squeeze does not hamper the classifier’s ac-
curacy while significantly decreasing the success proba-
bility of the attacker.
1 Introduction
Deep learning (DL) has advanced rapidly in recent years
fueled by big data and readily available cheap compu-
tation power. Beyond standard machine learning ap-
plications, DL has been found extremely useful in nu-
merous security-critical applications such as face recog-
nition [31] and malware classification [2,12,36].
When used in such applications, recent studies show
that DL is particularly vulnerable to adversarial sam-
ples, which are obtained from correctly classified sam-
ples by adding carefully selected perturbations to fool
classifiers [6, 10, 17, 24]. These perturbations are chosen
in such a way that they are large enough to affect the
model prediction but small enough to go unnoticed (e.g.,
by a visual check in image recognition applications).
To face the ever increasing number of attacks against
DL algorithms, several defensive techniques have been
proposed in the literature [20,23,26,35]. Traditional de-
fense strategies advocate hiding model parameters [26],
limiting feature space [22], and providing response to
each query on the basis of training data in the vicin-
ity of the query [20]. However, the effectiveness of such
strategies in thwarting adversarial samples is limited.
For instance, even when the model parameters are not
known, the adversary can use the input-output interface
of the classifier to train a substitute model, and then use
such model to find adversarial samples that transfer to
the original classifier.
To overcome these limitations, a number of recent de-
fenses [22, 35, 37] propose to squeeze features on input
data in order to limit the effect of adversarial samples.
Feature Squeezing [35] transforms input by reducing
unnecessary features without changing the DL model.
Here, the intuition is that squeezing the features limits
the adversary’s degree of freedom in choosing the per-
turbation, because different perturbations will have the
same effect after squeezing. Feature Squeezing is based
on the assumption that natural data leads to the same
prediction before and after squeezing, while adversarial
samples are more likely to yield different predictions in
original and transformed form. The discrepancy in out-
puts between original and squeezed input helps the clas-
sifier to detect adversarial samples and reject them. Ex-
amples of feature squeezing include changing the pixel
values by reducing color bit depth and smoothing pix-
els based on the values of their nearby pixels [35]. In
doing so, feature squeezing does not modify the original
classifier, but simply modifies the inputs that are being
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processed by the unmodified classifier.
However, feature squeezing is a deterministic process:
once an adversarial sample is found, it will always suc-
ceed. In other words, the adversary can create adversar-
ial samples, predict which ones will be rejected by the
model, and only use those (fewer) samples that remain
successful in spite of feature squeezing. When used in
security-critical applications, such an adversary is likely
to remain undetected and his samples will be misclassi-
fied all the times.
We argue that a secure machine learning defense
should not only harden the task of finding adversarial
examples, but it should also seek to effectively prevent
the adversary from predicting the success of the vari-
ous samples that have been already found. Namely, a
secure machine learning system should ensure that no
adversary which does not know the randomization strat-
egy can reliably distinguish whether a given adversarial
sample succeeds.
In this work, we address this problem and propose
a defense that mitigates attacks on feature squeezing
when used in an image classification setting (a set-
ting where where adversarial examples have been most
explored). Namely, we develop a security model to
formally define robustness of machine learning algo-
rithms under various adversarial classes. Our security
model is inspired by cryptographic definitions of secu-
rity, and aims to specifically capture the notion of un-
predictability of successful adversarial samples. We then
present our solution, Mix’n’Squeeze, that enhances fea-
ture squeezing to achieve the aforementioned property
of unpredictability. More specifically, Mix’n’Squeeze
embeds specially-crafted key-based randomness within
the input to the classifier. The input-randomization
process operates on every pixel of the image indepen-
dently by adding randomly chosen values to all pixels,
and the so-transformed image is then fed to the original
classifier. Our strategy ensures that input randomiza-
tion does not significantly affect the classifier’s predic-
tions on legitimate inputs, yet it significantly reduces
the success rate of state-of-the-art (blackbox and gray-
box) attacks and, due to the randomness, it introduces
unpredictability to the success of adversarial samples.
We empirically evaluate the effectiveness of
Mix’n’Squeeze against state of the art strate-
gies [1, 6, 10, 13, 17, 21, 25] to generate adversarial
samples from MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet
datasets. Our experimental results show that-
Mix’n’Squeeze is effective in hardening security against
adversarial samples in the sense of unpredictability
of successful samples. Namely, our results show that
introducing carefully crafted key-based randomness at
pixel level when performing feature squeezing does not
hamper the accuracy of the overall system when com-
pared to the deterministic feature squeezing solution
due to [35]. More surprisingly, our results also suggest
that Mix’n’Squeeze can improve the overall accuracy
compared to existing defenses against blackbox and
graybox adversaries [35].
We argue that Mix’n’Squeeze is generic and can be ef-
fectively fitted to a multitude of applications—beyond
image classification. Namely, although a number of con-
tributions hint on the use of randomization as a possible
avenue to strengthen the security of DL algorithms, we
believe that this work emerges as the first comprehensive
work that analyzes both qualitatively and empirically
the impact of key-based randomness on this family of
machine learning algorithms under state of the art ad-
versarial strategies.
We summarize our contributions as follows:
Security Model. We develop a novel security model
that formalizes robustness of machine learning algo-
rithms under evasion attacks. Our framework is generic,
captures a broad variety of machine learning systems
and applications, and addresses a security goal that has
not been covered so far, namely unpredictability of (the
success of) adversarial samples in a graybox model.
Concrete Instantiation. We propose Mix’n’Squeeze,
a novel deep-learning defensive strategy that extends
feature squeezing to increase its robustness against ad-
versarial samples. Mix’n’Squeeze randomizes all pix-
els of an input image, one by one, by adding carefully
selected randomness such that the accuracy does not
considerably degrade while adversarial samples are no
longer effective.
Implementation & Evaluation. We implement and
evaluate our solution in the context of image classifica-
tion on the MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets.
We show that Mix’n’Squeeze does not hamper the ac-
curacy of the classifier and increases robustness against
state of the art graybox strategies—with a boost in ac-
curacy on adversarial samples from 0% to 70-95% for
the He et al. attack [13], which completely defeats Fea-
ture Squeezing.
The rest this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents background of adversarial learning and related
work in the area. In Section 3, we present our security
model to define robustness of machine learning classi-
fiers to adversarial samples. In Section 4, we present
our solution Mix’n’Squeeze, and evaluate its effective-
ness to adversarial samples by performing extensive ex-
periments against state-of-the art attacks in Section 5.
We conclude the paper in Section 6.
2
2 Background and Related Work
In this section we introduce the notation and relevant
concepts for the subsequent sections of this paper; we
summarize the most prominent attacks against machine
learning algorithms, and discuss existing defensive tech-
niques that aim at mitigating these attacks.
2.1 Notation & Conventions
Let X be a (finite) set, and let D : X → [0,1] be a prob-
ability distribution. We denote by x←D X the random
sampling of an element x according to distribution D;
we write x←$ X for sampling x uniformly at random.
Similarly, for n ∈ N we write S←D Xn to indicate that
set S is defined by sampling n elements from X with dis-
tribution D. If R(x) is a random variable based on the
random choice x←D X , we denote its expected value
by ED[R(x)]. For an event E, we denote by 1E the ran-
dom variable such that 1E = 1 if E occurs, else 1E = 0.
A classification problem for a function f : X →Y con-
sists in assigning to instances x ∈ X the corresponding
class (or label) y ∈ Y . We refer to such a function f as
ground truth. The goal of a machine-learning system for
classification is to derive, given a set of labeled instances
(x,y) such that y = f (x), an algorithm C—called classi-
fier or model—that emulates function f . The process of
deriving a classifier from labeled instances is referred to
as training, while when the actual classifier is deployed
we talk about testing. Typically, the classifier is deter-
ministic and can be thus thought of as a function. In
this work, however, we cover a broader class of classifiers
and let C be any, possibly randomized algorithm. If C
is randomized, we write y←$ C(x) to denote that on in-
put x the classifier, run on freshly sampled randomness,
outputs label y.
Accuracy and error. Let C : X →Y be a determin-
istic classifier. For X ′ ⊆ X we denote by X ′3(C) = {x ∈
X ′ : C(x) = f (x)} the set of instances in X ′ where C agrees
with f . Similarly, we denote by X ′7(C) = {x ∈ X ′ : C(x) 6=
f (x)} the set of misclassified instances.
Let D : X→ [0,1] be any distribution over the instance
space. The (expected) accuracy of a classifier C with
respect to D is the probability over the choice of x←D X
that C agrees with f on input x:
accD(C) := Pr
x←DX
[C(x) = f (x)] = ED[1h(x)= f (x)]. (1)
Similarly, the classifier’s (expected) error is the prob-
ability that C makes a mistake on a randomly chosen
x←D X :
errD(C) := Pr
x←DX
[C(x) 6= f (x)] = ED[1h(x)6= f (x)]. (2)
By definition, it holds accD(C) = 1− errD(C). Accuracy
and error provide a metric to determine how well a given
classifier approximates the ground truth on instances
chosen according to distribution D. Using the notation
introduced above, the expected error can be interpreted
as the probability of a randomly chosen instance x←D X
falling in the error space X7(C). In reality, the ‘natural’
distribution D on the input space X is unknown, and
can at best be represented by available (correctly) la-
beled data. More pragmatic metrics are the classifier’s
empirical accuracy, respectively, empirical error w.r.t. a
given dataset D = {(x, f (x)) : x ∈ XD}, for some XD ⊂ X :
accXD(C) :=
|XD3 (C)|
|XD| and errXD(C) :=
|XD7 (C)|
|XD| (3)
For randomized classifiers, the definitions of expected
error and empirical error need to be augmented to in-
corporate the randomness of the classifier. A natural
way is to average, in both cases, over such randomness.
Note that accuracy and error can also be used to cap-
ture the performance of a classifier w.r.t. an adversari-
ally chosen distribution DA, respectively, input set XA.
2.2 Adversarial Samples
The accuracy of a machine-learning algorithm is mea-
sured w.r.t. samples drawn from a ‘natural’ distribu-
tion D : X → [0,1] over the input space. This ap-
proach is grounded in results from computational learn-
ing theory [32], which guarantee a low classification er-
ror as long as samples used at test time originate from
the same distribution of the training samples. How-
ever, while this assumption may be realistic in a pure
machine-learning setting, it is hard to justify in gen-
eral. In cybersecurity, for instance, the “test samples”
are generated by an adversary A attempting to bypass
a machine-learning protected system, and may thus be
specifically crafted to deviate from the training samples.
This state of affair has been confirmed by the recent ad-
vances in attacking machine learning systems through
adversarial samples (a.k.a. adversarial samples) [30].
An adversarial sample is typically defined as a slightly
perturbed instance x′, obtained from some labeled sam-
ple (x,y), that belongs to the original class despite
the perturbation, yet is classified wrongly. Formally:
x and x′ have a relatively small distance d(x,x′) ≤ ε,
f (x′) = y, and C(x′) 6= y. The intuition behind this def-
inition originates from image classification: the pertur-
bation ε is sufficiently small to guarantee that x′ (vi-
sually) looks the same as x, and at the same time it is
large enough to induce the classifier to make a mistake
on x′. In this context, the three most common metrics to
measure the distance between an adversarial sample x′
and its legitimate counterpart x are based on the Lp-
norms (L0, L2, and L∞): (i) d0(x,x′) = |{i : xi− x′i 6= 0}|,
based on the number of modified pixels; (ii) d2(x,x′) =
3
(
∑i(xi − x′i)2
) 1
2 , based on the Euclidean distance; (iii)
d∞(x,x′) = maxi(xi− x′i), based on the maximum differ-
ence between pixels at corresponding positions.
In the formulas above, xi−x′i is the difference between
the pixels at position i of image x and image x′, respec-
tively. For a distance metric dp, we denote by || · ||p the
corresponding norm.
Depending on the attacker’s goal, adversarial sam-
ples can be categorized as targeted and untargeted. A
targeted adversarial sample x′ is one that the classifier
predicts as belonging to a targeted label yt 6= y, where y
is the true label; an untargeted sample is assigned any
label rather than y instead.
2.3 Generating Adversarial Samples
The rest of this section presents prominent techniques
to generate adversarial samples against DL systems.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). Given an
input x, the FGSM method [10] generates an adver-
sarial sample x′ by applying a small perturbation to
all pixels of x, where “small” means up to a certain
threshold ε according to the L∞-norm. Concretely, x′ is
crafted by calculating one-step gradient update on x (de-
noted ∇x) with perturbation of magnitude ε, as follows:
x′ = x+ε · sign(∇xL(C(x),y)). Here, L(C(x),y) is the loss
of the classifier for returning label C(x) when the true
label is y, and ε represents the tolerated amount of per-
turbation on all pixels of x which ensures that x and x′
are visually unchanged. The perturbation is chosen in
order to maximize L(C(x′),y).
Basic Iterative Method (BIM). BIM [17] applies
FGSM iteratively, each time with smaller step-width
perturbation α  ε. For each iteration, every pixel
value of the “current” resulting image that exceeds an
ε-neighborhood of x (according to L2 or L∞) is clipped,
as follows: x′i+1 = clipε,x(x
′
i +α · sign(∇xL(C(x′i),y))).
Jacobian Saliency Map Approach (JSMA). In
contrast to FGSM and BIM, the JSMA method [25]
generates x′ by modifying only a subset of x’s pixels.
To this end, JSMA selects so-called high saliency pix-
els for perturbation according to the values of the for-
ward derivative matrix ∇xC(x). The salience score is
calculated for each pixel to describe how the pixel will
contribute to the target class label yt . This process is
repeated until the attack succeeds.
Carlini-Wagner (CW). CW attacks [6] use tech-
niques that require only small perturbations on inputs,
work for both targeted and untargeted attacks, and
are compatible with all of the distance metrics L0, L2
and L∞. Given an image x and a distance metric Lp,
p∈ {0,2,∞}, the CW method uses existing optimization
algorithms to search for a value ε such that x+ε ∈ [0,1]n
and the quantity ||ε||p+c ·g(x+ε) is minimized, where c
is an empirically chosen parameter, and g is a predic-
tion objective function such that g(x′) ≤ 0 if and only
if the predicted label C(x′) is incorrect (meaning that
the attack succeeds). There are different options to
choose g. One of those is g(x′) =max(Z(x′)y−max(Z(x′)i :
i 6= y),−k). Here y is the ground truth label of x and Z(x′)
is the pre-softmax classification result vector (i.e., log-
its); and −k is the configurable confidence level of the
attack. The perturbation result must be still a valid im-
age, i.e., ∀i,0≤ xi+εi≤ 1. This is called“box constraint”
in the context of optimization.
DeepFool. The basic idea of DeepFool attack [21] is to
find the closest decision boundary to a given input im-
age x and iteratively perturbate x until the resulting x′
crosses the boundary, so that it can fool the classifier.
As it is hard to search for the closest boundary in high
dimensional and non-linear spaces, DeepFool solves the
problem on approximated linear spaces. Given an input
image x and a classifier C, this method generates a can-
didate adversarial sample for a given iteration by first
linearizing C around the current x′ and then obtaining
the next sample as x′ = x+ r where r = argminr′ ||r′||p,
subject to C(x′) 6= C(x) and for any p-norm. This pro-
cess generates adversarial samples which require small
perturbation to cross the boundary.
2.4 Defensive techniques
In this section we discuss several defensive techniques
that aim at thwarting adversarial samples.
Adversarial Training. As we mentioned earlier, a
classifier is guaranteed to make good predictions at
test time as long as it has been trained on (sufficiently
many) samples drawn from the same distribution as the
test samples. The idea behind adversarial training is
based on this principle: to make the input distribu-
tion at training time closer to the one at test time,
known adversarial samples are added (together with cor-
rect ground-truth labels) to the training set. Grosse et
al. [11] propose to introduce an additional class for ad-
versarial samples and retrain the classifier to also recog-
nize such class. Concretely, the classifier is first trained
normally on the original training data; the resulting
classifier is then used (as a target) to generate successful
adversarial samples; finally, the so obtained adversarial
samples are labeled and used, together with the origi-
nal training data, to train a new classifier; the latter is
supposedly robust against adversarial samples. Gong et
al. [9] introduce a technique to build a binary classifier
for clustering normal samples and adversarial samples.
Madry et al. [19] propose a generic training method-
ology targeting robustness against all adversarial sam-
ples generated by applying small perturbations. This
4
methodology is based on the idea that, if the training
set contains sufficiently representative adversarial sam-
ples, the resulting classifier will be able to withstand
every attack. Following this principle, the “sufficiently
representative” adversarial samples are generated using
a projected gradient descent (PDG) attack, which is a
variant of the BIM attack and is referred to as a “uni-
versal”attack among the first-order approaches. The re-
sulting trained networks, based on MNIST and CIFAR
datasets respectively, achieve different levels of robust-
ness against FGSM, PGD, and CW attacks.
Although prior work [9,11,19,29,30] has demonstrated
the feasibility of this technique, adversarial training re-
quires a large number of samples that are expensive to
generate. In addition, it does not resist unknown at-
tacks.
Defensive Distillation. In deep learning, distillation
is a training procedure initially designed to train a net-
work using knowledge transferred from another network.
Defensive distillation [26], instead of transferring knowl-
edge between different architectures, was proposed to
use the knowledge extracted from the same network to
improve its own resilience to adversarial samples. Distil-
lation allows the model to generalize better to samples
outside of its training dataset. To perform a distilla-
tion, the first neural network is trained normally with
original training data. The “softmax” layer is defined as
a layer that receives the output of the last hidden layer
of the network in form of a probability vector which
represents a probability to each class of the dataset to
the input. The probability vector outputs from the first
network are then used to labeled the training data for
the second network. The second network is trained by
this newly labeled data. Output of the second network
is a probability vector prediction. More specifically, de-
fensive distillation trains the classifier to be resilient to
gradient-based attacks by hiding gradient between soft-
max layer and the output layer. Unfortunately defensive
distillation is still evaded according to [6].
Detection of Adversarial Samples. Early meth-
ods to detect adversarial samples [8, 11] derive statis-
tical properties from large datasets of legitimate sam-
ples and of adversarial samples, and then inspect those
properties to tell whether a new and unknown sample
is legitimate or adversarial. Even though these tech-
niques where shown to be quite robust, they are com-
putationally expensive and require large datasets for the
reliability of statistical results. A different approach
is to train a detector to specifically learn adversarial
samples. An instantiation of this technique was intro-
duced by Meng and Chen [20], who propose a system—
dubbed MagNet—that uses detector and reformer net-
works. MagNet relies on the assumption that “natural”
data lie on a manifold of significantly smaller dimension
than the whole input space X , while most “adversar-
ial” samples fall outside the manifold. Concretely, it
employs a detector which deems samples far from the
manifold as adversarial, and a reformer for those sam-
ples that fall off, but are close enough to, the manifold,
effectively moving them towards the manifold and en-
forcing that adversarial samples generated with a small
perturbation are “sanitized”. Xu et al. [35] propose a
similar approach, i.e., feature squeezing, to detect adver-
sarial samples using the discrepancy of output predic-
tions between adversarial and legitimate samples which
indicate malicious inputs. This method is less expensive
compared to MagNet.
Input Transformation. Input transformation is a
technique that does not require changing the trained
model. The goal is to reduce the sensitivity of the model
to small changes in input. It has been suggested to re-
duce the number of dimensions of input [22], however
it also changes input’s structure making it no longer a
valid format for the classification model.
Recent defenses [12, 20, 37] propose to squeeze fea-
tures on input data to disable effect of adversarial sam-
ples crafted by performing small perturbations to legit-
imate inputs. MagNet [20] introduces two reforming
techniques on input: noise-based reformer and autoen-
coder reformer. In the former, random noise is applied
to both normal and adversarial samples. In the latter,
an autoencoder transforms the input through a process
of encoding and then decoding such that the reconstruc-
tion error is minimal on legitimate samples. The autoen-
coder transforms adversarial samples so that they end
up closer to the legitimate samples and thus helping
in correct classification. The autoencoder learns from
training dataset (on legitimate samples) in order to min-
imize construction error between encoding and decoding
outputs. MagNet allows to randomly choose an autoen-
coder among a set of pre-trained autoencoders. This
prohibits the attacker to predict which autoencoder will
transform the adversarial input, thus complicating their
task.
Randomness-based defenses. Zhou et al. [38] pro-
pose two ways to use randomness for strengthening
DNN models: to add random noise to the weights of
a trained DNN model, and to select at random a model
from a pool of train DNN models for each test input.
Xie et al. [34] use randomness in a different way: to
resize the image to a random size, or to add padding
zeroes in a randomized fashion. Both techniques are
orthogonal to ours.
Cao and Gong [4] propose a technique region-based
classification that is, at a first look, similar in spirit
to ours. Given a test sample x, region-based classifica-
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tion chooses multiple data points uniformly at random
from a hypercube centered at x, computes the corre-
sponding labels according to the original DNN model,
and returns the majority vote among these labels. The
authors claim that region-based classification is equiva-
lent to adding random noise to the input image. Note,
however, that while our technique adds random noise
to all pixels of the input and then makes a prediction
on the resulting image, region-based classification does
not touch the individual pixels but generates multiple
images instead.
Certified defenses. A recent approach to combat
adversarial samples is to design so-called certified de-
fenses [7, 14, 27, 28, 33], which provide provable guaran-
tees against bounded adversarial perturbations. Given
a classifier and an input image, the idea is to derive an
upper bound on the worst-case loss against norm-based
attackers. Such bound provides a “certificate of robust-
ness”, as it guarantees that no perturbation within the
allowed threshold can turn the starting image into an
adversarial one, therefore ruling out all attacks which
are restricted to the given threshold. Certified defenses
offer a promising direction towards ending the arms race
between attackers and defenders. However, these tech-
niques need further investigation as they currently do
not scale to large datasets.
A more scalable solution is the PixelDP transform
by Le´cuyer et al. [18]. PixelDP leverages differential
privacy to increase the robustness of a generic classi-
fier, and offers probabilistic1 certificates of robustness
for several datasets, including ImageNet which is large.
This solution trades scalability with clean-data accu-
racy, which drops significantly as the allowed adversarial
perturbation increases. However, despite offering prov-
able guarantees, robustness certificates only hold with
respect to the original image, meaning that only test in-
puts can be certified [5]. It is thus unclear which guar-
antees a robustness certificate can offer for data that
was not part of the test set. This limitation is particu-
larly evident in applications such as face or handwritten
recognition where it is virtually impossible to capture all
possible images within the original test set.
Feature squeezing This technique, introduced by
Xu et al. [35], transforms the input by reducing un-
necessary features while keeping the DL model intact.
Feature Squeezing is a generic transformation technique
to reduce feature input space such that it can limit
opportunities for an adversary to generate adversarial
samples. The approach assumes that legitimate sam-
ples have same output on original and transformed form
while adversarial samples have larger difference on out-
1The certificates are “probabilistic” due to the differential-
privacy noise introduced by the defense.
puts, the discrepancy of outputs helps to reject adver-
sarial samples. In this paper, we study the two pro-
posed squeezing techniques, squeezing color bit depths
and spatial smoothing.
Squeezing color bits relies on the assumption that
large color bit depth is not necessary for a classifier to
interpret an image. The authors consider 8-bit gray
scale images of size 28×28 pixels (MNIST dataset) and
24-bit color images of size 32×32 pixels (CIFAR-10 and
ImageNet datasets) in their experiments. The 8-bit gray
scale images are squeezed to 1-bit monochrome images
by using a binary filter with cut-off set to 0.5, while
each channel of the 24-bit color images (8-bit per color
channel) is squeezed to 4 or 5 bits. Each channel can
be reduced to i-bit depth by multiplying the input value
with 2i−1, rounded up to integers and then divided by
2i−1 to scale back to [0,1].
The local smoothing is a type of spatial smoothing
technique that adjusts the value of each pixel based on
aggregated values, e.g., by taking median of its neigh-
borhood pixels. The median smoothing technique fol-
lows Gaussian smoothing design. The values of neigh-
borhood pixels are decided by a configurable sliding
window of which size ranges from 1 to entire image.
Experiments in [35] show that median smoothing with
2×2 and 3×3 sliding window is effective. Another way
to perform spatial smoothing is non-local smoothing.
Non-local smoothing considers a large area to compute
replacement value for each pixel. Given an image patch,
non-local smoothing searches for all similar patches and
replaces the center patch with the average of similar
patches. We use the notation proposed by Xu et al. [35]
to denote a filter as “non-local means (a-b-c)”, where a
is the search window a×a, b the patch size b×b and c
the filter strength. Compared to MagNet [20], feature
squeezing is superior in some cases but worse in others.
3 Security Model
In this section, we present a security model for evasion
attacks that allows us to define security of a classifier
in terms of robustness and, in addition, in the sense of
unpredictability of the success of adversarial samples.
Motivation. In deep learning based systems, the exis-
tence of adversarial samples cannot be avoided. There-
fore, research so far has focused on reducing the number
of adversarial samples and making their discovery hard.
The outcome of this effort is a series of defenses that ei-
ther aim to detect adversarial samples and discard them,
thus narrowing the space of potential errors, or to train
the classifier on known adversarial samples, effectively
correcting the classifier’s output on these samples.
There is, however, a problem that all these defensive
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techniques have in common: once a successful adversar-
ial sample has been found, it will always succeed—until
the classifier is retrained. All in all, despite the effort
in reducing adversarial samples, little thought has been
given to make the success of adversarial samples un-
predictable. To overcome the above limitation, we set
out to propose a defense which makes it hard to pre-
dict whether a given sample will be misclassified. Since
no deterministic defense can meet such requirement, in
Section 4 we design a technique that randomizes the
classification process in order to make it harder for an
adversary to predict whether a given adversarial sample
will be misclassified.
In the rest of this section, we introduce a general secu-
rity model that covers both deterministic and random-
ized classification algorithms, and allows us to define
robustness to adversarial samples as well as the afore-
mentioned concept of unpredictability.
Evasion attacks. Our model considers an attack sce-
nario in which an adversary A aims at defeating a clas-
sifier C by generating adversarial samples starting from
“natural” samples. Following the approach of modern
cryptography, our security model reproduces the above
scenario through a security game between A and C, that
we name evasion under chosen-sample attacks (EV-
CSA). The game is illustrated in Figure 1.
Game EV-CSAA,ε,N(C,XD):
1 q← 0, n← 0
2 XA← /0
3 A(ε,N,〈C〉,XD)Classify,Attack
4 Return n/N
Oracle Classify(x):
5 yˆ←C(x)
6 Give yˆ to A
Oracle Attack(x,x′,yt):
7 If q≥ N: Go to line 4
8 Enforce (x,∗) /∈ XA
9 q← q+1
10 XA ∪← (x,x′)
11 If C(x′) = yt and d(x′,x)≤ ε:
12 n← n+1
13 Return
Figure 1: Security game for targeted evasion under
chosen-sample attacks (EV-CSA), involving an adver-
sary A against a classifier C. To capture untargeted
attacks it suffices to replace the inputs to the Attack or-
acle with pairs (x,x′) and the first condition of line 11
with C(x′) 6= C(x) (i.e., A specifies no target label).
The adversary’s goal in the EV-CSA game is to
present a number of adversarial samples generated from
a set XD ⊂ X of “naturally occurring” samples (which
we implicitly assume to be labeled).2 The number N
of adversarial samples, 1≤ N ≤ |XD|, is a game parame-
ter and, as we will see later, can be adapted to capture
different security goals.
We specify the amount of information that A has
2In practice, XD represents a set of available images used for
testing, e.g., MNIST.
about the adversarial task by passing the relevant in-
puts: the allowed distortion ε, the number N of adver-
sarial samples, the classifier’s code 〈C〉, and the set XD
of benign samples. Further, by limiting the amount of
information encoded in 〈C〉, our game can cover differ-
ent adversarial models such as “whitebox” (a.k.a. fully
adaptive), meaning that A knows every detail about the
classifier, including neural-network weights and any de-
fense mechanism in place, “blackbox” (a.k.a. non adap-
tive), i.e., A knows only public information about C,
and intermediate attacker’s models, so-called “graybox”
(a.k.a. semi-adaptive), in which A has only partial infor-
mation about the classifier’s internals and/or defensive
layers. Graybox attacks include those agnostic of a de-
fense mechanism. In this case, the adversary knows the
original classifier fully, hence it is not blackbox, but it
does not know the defense, hence it is not whitebox ei-
ther. These adversaries are often called non adaptive in
the literature, meaning “non adaptive to the defense”.
As we will see later, our defense improves robustness
against blackbox and graybox adversaries; we stress,
however, that the EV-CSA game is general enough to
capture all the aforementioned attacker models.
We further let the adversary interact with the classi-
fier through an oracle Classify, i.e., A can query C on any
input x of their choosing and obtain the corresponding
label yˆ = C(x). The game also provides the adversary
with a second oracle, denoted by Attack, which lets A
submit candidate adversarial samples. This oracle al-
lows us to describe A’s goal formally and to define ro-
bustness to adversarial samples, as we see next. The
adversary can present an adversarial sample by submit-
ting a query (x,x′,yt) to the Attack oracle, where x is
the starting sample, x′ is the candidate adversarial sam-
ple, and yt is the target label. Upon being queried, the
oracle then checks whether the adversary reached the
query limit q≥ N, terminating the game in such a case
(cf. line 4). Otherwise, it checks whether the adversarial
sample x′ is “fresh”, in the sense that no other adversar-
ial sample x′′ has been already proposed for the same
starting image x (cf. line 8), which is necessary to inval-
idate trivial attacks that artificially achieve high success
rate, e.g., by presenting “the same” adversarial sample
over and over, in a trivially modified version.3 If the
query gets through the checks, the oracle adds the fresh
pair (x,x′) to the adversarial set XA, and further checks
whether the classifier errs on x′ as desired, by predicting
its class as yt , and whether x′ is sufficiently close to x,
i.e., d(x,x′) ≤ ε according to some pre-established dis-
tance metric d. In case of success, the game rewards
the adversary by increasing the counter n which records
3Changing a few pixels of a successful adversarial sample x′
yields a new sample x′′ 6= x′ which is very likely to also be success-
ful, thus A should only get credit for one of them.
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the number of successful samples (cf. line 12).
Once the attacker submits N adversarial samples, that
we call the chosen samples, the game terminates by out-
putting the success rate of the adversary, i.e., the por-
tion of chosen samples that fooled the classifier. For a
given execution of the security game involving adver-
sary A, with perturbation budget ε, “playing” against
classifier C for a dataset XD, we denote the game’s out-
put by succev-csaA,ε,N(C,XD) = n/N, which stands for success
rate in the EV-CSA game. In the following, we may
slightly abuse notation and omit the game’s parame-
ters ε, N, and XD when they are clear from the context.
An execution of the EV-CSA game depends on the ad-
versarial strategy A and the classifier C—both of which
may be randomized. In particular, if the game depends
on any randomness (used by the adversary, by the clas-
sifier, or both), the outcome is determined by the value
of the randomness, and the success rate is a random
variable. Henceforth, we restrict the attention to the
common case of deterministic adversaries; thus, for any
such adversary A, the success rate succev-csaA (C) exclu-
sively depends on the classifier’s randomness (if any).
Observe that the Classify oracle provides no extra
power to whitebox adversaries, as having full knowl-
edge of the classifier allows A to emulate the ora-
cle. It is, however, necessary to cover weaker attacks,
such as transferability attacks [24] (which are black-
box), and attacks oblivious of the defense (which are
graybox). In particular, the Classify oracle highlights
the above-mentioned vulnerability of deterministic clas-
sifiers against non-adaptive adversaries: since in this
case successful adversarial samples will always be mis-
classified, an adversary could run a defense-oblivious
strategy to generate adversarial samples, and then use
the Classify oracle to select, among those, the samples
that succeed.
Deterministic vs. randomized classifiers. We
stress that the Attack oracle does not reflect an actual
capability of the attacker, however, it provides a nat-
ural abstraction for determining A’s success rate. In
particular, if only deterministic classifiers were consid-
ered, having A submit their samples through the oracle
is equivalent to letting A present a set XA of N sam-
ples directly. In this case, A’s success rate would be:
succev-csaA,N (C) = nN =
|XA7 (C)|
|XA| = errXA(C), where errXA(C)
is the empirical error of C w.r.t. the set of adversar-
ial samples XA (as defined in Equation (3) on page 3).
That is, the usual notion of success rate against de-
terministic classifiers is a special case of our notion.
The reason for introducing the Attack oracle is precisely
that, when randomized classifiers are considered, it is
no longer meaningful to talk about a set of adversarial
examples (a given sample x′ may be correctly labeled for
some choices of C’s randomness while being misclassified
for a different randomness).
Defining effective defenses and robustness. Our
security game provides a formal language to express the
effectiveness of a defense in making a given classifier
“more robust”to attacks. For a classifier C, let Cd denote
the classifier obtained from C by applying a defense d.
Intuitively, a defense d is effective against an attack A
if either the success rate of A after applying the defense
is significantly smaller than their success rate when no
defense is in place, or a larger distortion is necessary
to achieve that success rate. Formally, we say that a
defense d for classifier C is effective against attack A,
or equivalently that Cd is more robust than C, if either
succev-csaA,N (Cd) succev-csaA,N (C) or εd  ε.
Defining different adversarial tasks. While the
security game allows us to compactly capture several
evasion scenarios, it is not sufficient, by itself, to tell
whether a given attack strategy is “good” against the
attacked classifier. What is missing is a characteriza-
tion of the attacker’s goal in terms of their success rate.
In fact, the attacker’s goal in bypassing the classifier is
tightly coupled with the application that uses the clas-
sifier in the first place, and it may thus vary depending
on such application.
For the sake of generality, we deliberately avoid giv-
ing a strict definition for A being successful, i.e., we do
not impose any specific restriction to A’s success rate,
so that the model can be flexibly adapted to capture a
broad range of application scenarios. Concretely, we
let our security game be parameterized by the num-
ber N of chosen samples that the adversary is expected
to present, and by a threshold τ for a “good” success
rate, because both values vary depending on the appli-
cation to be protected. Indeed, in some cases a secu-
rity breach occurs if the adversary can find even just
one successful adversarial sample (i.e., n = 1), while in
other cases only a large number of misclassified samples
(n≈ N) represents a serious threat.
Loosely speaking, A’s goal in violating the security of
a machine learning application is to achieve a given suc-
cess rate for a reasonable value N. More precisely, given
application-specific parameters N ∈ N and τ ∈ (0,1], we
say that the adversary is successful against the classi-
fier (i.e., they violate the security of the system) if they
achieve a success rate of at least τ in the EV-CSA game.
We correspondingly define A’s advantage as the proba-
bility of A being successful:
Advev-csaA,N,τ(C) = Pr
[
succev-csaA,N (C)≥ τ
]
, (4)
where the probability is taken over the randomness of
the EV-CSA game (including A’s and C’s randomness).
Notice that in the deterministic case—both A and C
8
are deterministic algorithms—the advantage is simply a
boolean value indicating whether A is successful or not:
Advev-csaA,N,τ(C) =
{
1 if succev-csaA,N (C)≥ τ
0 o/w,
(5)
4 Mix’n’Squeeze: Overview and Design
In this section, we present our solution to enhance the
robustness of machine learning defenses to adversarial
samples. We start off by discussing the general principle
behind our defense, namely to make the success of ad-
versarial samples unpredictable. We then describe our
solution, Mix’n’Squeeze, which implements this princi-
ple via input randomization.
4.1 Overview of Mix’n’Squeeze
One way to introduce“unpredictability”to the responses
of a deterministic classifier is to retrain regularly in
the background: this prevents adversarial samples (that
were successful at some point) to fool the classifier again
at a later time. We note, however, that while imple-
menting this measure could reduce the effectiveness of
adversaries, it would also significantly increase the com-
putational costs due to re-iterating the training process
on a regular basis. One possible advantage of regular
retraining is that every adversarial sample which is de-
tected as such will, later on, be always classified cor-
rectly. Thus, to be successful in the long run, an adver-
sary has to constantly search for new adversarial sam-
ples. On the downside, retraining a deterministic clas-
sifier does not offer protection in the short term, as the
classifier’s decisions within two training periods are de-
terministic, and can thus be predicted for already seen
inputs. Also, it requires human intervention to correct
misclassifications, which is an expensive process.
In this work, we explore a different avenue to enhance
deep learning defenses by introducing “unpredictabil-
ity” via input randomization. Our defense, that we
name Mix’n’Squeeze, introduces randomness at fea-
ture level, for each feature component and within a pre-
defined threshold, so that it does not bias the predic-
tion excessively in any particular direction. The intu-
ition here is to slightly randomize every input in a man-
ner to which adversary cannot adapt by predicting it
in advance. Most deep learning models are sensitive to
changes in input. If carefully crafted, even minor per-
turbations can lead to a misclassification (which can in
principle be controlled by adversaries). We stress that
adding randomness individually to each pixel is differ-
ent from perturbing the entire image at random. While
the randomness added at individual feature level does
not destroy the patterns of the pixels, which is critical
for correct classification, it does introduce a source of
unpredictability in the defense mechanism which—we
argue—makes attacks less likely to succeed. Namely,
adding randomness makes it hard for the adversary to
search for adversarial perturbations as the system is no
longer predictable. This forces the adversary to make
perturbations larger in order to subsume the random-
ness introduced without violating the distance bounds,
resulting in a considerably harder task. In addition, the
randomized nature of the resulting classifier no longer
guarantees that identical adversarial inputs yield the
same predictions: given this, an adversary who finds a
successful adversarial sample is not guaranteed to suc-
ceed with such sample all the times.
Note that we introduce randomness to the input only
while testing and not while training: this is done to
ensure we train a diverse classifier which works for a
varied set of inputs. Limiting the training would result
in a rigid classifier which cannot handle a diverse set
of inputs, whereas adding randomness only limits the
input samples and not the classifier itself.
The increased robustness achieved by randomized
classifiers clearly depends on the quality of the ran-
domness, which should be unpredictable from the adver-
sary’s perspective. Thus, it is crucial for security that
the random noise be generated from a high-entropy key
to seed the underlying cryptographic random number
generator (PRG)—to achieve the strong cryptographic
property of pseudorandomness [3].
Note that the proposed defense is independent of the
machine learning model and acts as a protective layer
between user input and the classifier in conjunction with
the defense in place. The modularity allows plugging the
defense layer to any machine learning model.
Concretely, when applied to image classification,
Mix’n’Squeeze preprocesses the image input to the orig-
inal classifier C by adding a perturbation rand, chosen
uniformly at random from the real interval [−δ ,+δ ],
δ ∈ [0,1], to each pixel. Here, we denote by C a generic
DL classifier enhanced with feature squeezing as de-
scribed in Section 2.4. More specifically, Mix’n’Squeeze
comprises of the following subroutines:
Setup. This procedure performs any instruction needed
to initialize the original system. In addition, it sets the
value δ ∈ [0,1] for the magnitude of the randomness (set-
ting δ = 0 leaves the input unchanged, while δ = 1 is al-
most equivalent to generating a fresh input uniformly at
random), and initializes the random number generator.
The value of δ is crucial to preserve the accuracy of the
classifier as well as improving its robustness to adver-
sarial samples. We discuss this in detail in Section 5.2.
Training. Since our defense mechanism does not af-
fect the training phase, this step is the same as for the
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original system. Upon completion of this phase, we can
assume a trained (deterministic) classifier C : X → Y for
images in X , which we will use as a basis for our ran-
domized classifier C$, as we see next.
Classification. Upon receiving an input image x,
the randomized classifier C$ proceeds as follows: it se-
lects a uniformly random key ks to seed the under-
lying pseudorandom generator G, hence expands this
key, feeding nonces to G, until a sufficient amount of
(pseudo)randomness has been generated to randomize
all pixels of x. The randomization of each pixel Pixel[i]
consists in adding a random value rand ∈ [−δ ,+δ ].
When the value of the pixel goes outside the allowed
intensity threshold (normalized to [0,1] in our experi-
ments), we clip them at the edges instead of taking a
modulo and wrapping around. This is performed to
bias the randomness for pixels that are close to the in-
tensity thresholds, which helps to preserve accuracy of
the classifier for legitimate samples. The process is re-
peated for every color channel. Hence, for grayscale
images, we add randomization just once as there is
only one channel, while for color RGB images ran-
domness is added three times, once for each channel
(i.e., “R”, “G”, and “B”, respectively), individually per
pixel. The pre-processing routine of Mix’n’Squeeze is
described in Figure 2. Finally, the image x′ resulting
from running Randomizepixels on input x is then fed to
the (deterministic) classifier C, and the resulting predic-
tion yˆ = C(x′) is returned as label for x.
Randomizepixels(Pixels,δ )
ks←$ {0,1}keylen
for i← 1 to length[Pixels]
do Generate noncei
rand = G(ks,noncei)
 Choose rand randomly from [−δ ,δ ]
Pixels[i]← Pixels[i]+ rand
if Pixels[i] > 1
do Pixels[i] = 1
if Pixels[i] < 0
do Pixels[i] = 0
 Clip pixel values to allowed threshold
i← i+1
Figure 2: Randomizing image pixels via Mix’n’Squeeze.
The perturbation magnitude δ should be sufficiently
large to be effective against adversarial samples, and at
the same time be sufficiently small to preserve the clas-
sifier’s accuracy on normal samples. Therefore, an op-
timal value for δ should offer the best tradeoff between
accuracy and robustness. In Section 5, we analyze in
details how to choose δ in order to establish a strong
tradeoff between the achieved accuracy and robustness
for a classifier based on feature squeezing [35].
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Figure 3: Randomized classification with feature
squeezing (MNIST dataset, randomness magnitude (δ )
0.5, bit depth squeezing to pixel values 0, 0.5 and 1).
Figure 3 depicts an example of applying the
Randomizepixels subroutine of Mix’n’Squeeze to images
of hand-written digits taken from the MNIST dataset
(see Section 5 for details). We note that despite signifi-
cant observable noise, the images remain meaningful to
the human eye. We show in Section 5 that even a large
magnitude δ for the randomness does not remarkably
degrade the model accuracy.
4.2 Example: a graybox attack
As discussed in Section 3, the deterministic nature of
many defenses can be leveraged by adversaries to mount
successful attacks. Indeed, if a classifier makes deter-
ministic predictions, an adversary can search for suc-
cessful adversarial samples by observing the classifier’s
reaction on several inputs x′ obtained by gradually per-
turbing an initial sample x—picking the next perturba-
tion depending on how the current sample affects the
classifier—until they find one that fools the classifier.
Moreover, once such a successful adversarial sample has
been found, it would always be misclassified unless the
classifier is retrained with new data.
We argue that letting a classifier make probabilistic
predictions has the potential to significantly improve ro-
bustness against adversarial examples. Namely, assume
a scenario where the adversary can submit a number of
chosen samples N (e.g., we will set N = 25 for our eval-
uation) and, for the sake of analysis, all of them shall
be misclassified (i.e., τ = 1). This captures a number of
applications, such as authentication and access control,
in which legitimate users are identified by submitting
a specific PIN or password (bounded by a maximum
number of failed attempts).
Recall from the discussion of Section 3 that the ad-
versary’s advantage in the EV-CSA game (cf. Figure 1)
against a deterministic classifier C is 1 if A does reach
the targeted success rate τ, otherwise it is 0. Since we
require A to achieve success rate τ = 1, this means that
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an adversary can bypass the system if they can find
at least τ ·N = N adversarial samples. Note in partic-
ular that, due to the classifier being deterministic, A
can use C as an oracle (cf. oracle Classify in the evasion
game from Figure 1) to test whether a given example
succeeds or not and, if it does, that sample will always
be misclassified. Therefore, deterministic classifiers can
be completely bypassed as soon as an attacker finds suf-
ficiently many successful samples.
We argue that randomized classifiers can improve the
robustness of a machine learning system without pe-
nalizing accuracy. Due to the probabilistic nature of
the predictions made by a randomized classifier C$, the
success rate achieved by an adversary A that aims to
subvert Mix’n’Squeeze is a random variable (over the
randomness used by C$) which indicates the probability
of A achieving success rate τ = 1. Importantly, since the
classifier’s predictions depend on random choices made
internally by C$, the EV-CSA game against C$ is more
difficult than that against C, unless A can infer the ran-
domness used by C$—which would violate the security
of the pseudorandom generator in use.
We now analyze the provisions of a randomized clas-
sifier C$ against a graybox attacker A∗ that follows a
greedy strategy which seeks to maximize their advan-
tage in the EV-CSA game for threshold τ = 1. The at-
tack proceeds as follows. First, A∗ searches for adversar-
ial samples x′i’s which are misclassified by oracle Classify
and, for each of these samples, it computes an estimate
of the probability pˆi that x′i is labeled wrongly (this can
be done by submitting the same sample x′i multiple times
to Classify and counting how often it succeeds). Upon
completion of this step, the adversary collected a num-
ber of pairs (x′i, pˆi). Second, using the available pairs, A∗
selects N samples x′i1 , . . . ,x
′
iN among those which are most
likely to be misclassified (i.e., with highest pˆi value), and
submits these samples to the Attack oracle, one by one.
Assuming that the estimated values pˆi are exact, A∗
obtains the following advantage in the evasion game:
Advev-csaA∗,N,1(C$) = Pr
[
N⋂
k=1
{yˆ′ik 6= f (x′ik)}
]
=ΠNk=1 pˆik (6)
The advantage achieved by A∗ depends on how likely
the presented chosen samples are to be misclassified.
In the next section we study the aforementioned
attack when C$ is instantiated with our proposal.
In particular, Figure 6 shows how A∗’s advantage
against Mix’n’Squeeze varies with N when the adver-
sarial samples are generated from three specific datasets
using different attack strategies against the underlying
classifier C (see Section 5 for details). In almost all cases,
the advantage of A∗ against C$ (δ > 0) is considerably
smaller than the advantage achieved by the same strat-
egy when no randomization is used (δ = 0), especially
for small values of N (i.e., N ≤ 25). Indeed, while in
the deterministic case all attack strategies yield a rel-
ative large number N∗ of adversarial samples that al-
ways succeed (leading to advantage 1 for N ≤ N∗), our
defense ensures that only a few of these sample succeed
with high probability, and hence the achieved advantage
ΠNk=1 pˆik decreases significantly. As a concrete example,
consider an attack that generates adversarial samples
using targeted CW with norm L∞, and let the original
classifier C use Median Smoothing 2x2 as defense (cf. the
second graphic in row 2 and column 3 in Figure 6). For
N = 25, the advantage against C is 1, while it decreases
to 0.55, 0.1, and 0.05 respectively against Mix’n’Squeeze
when the magnitude of randomness is δ = 0.2, 0.5, and
0.8. Therefore, we argue that Mix’n’Squeeze is partic-
ularly well-suited to security-critical applications, espe-
cially those limiting the number of attempts an adver-
sary has to break in. For instance, such a solution could
be combined with other security measures to construct
a second-factor authentication system. In contrast, in a
similar scenario, a deterministic classifier would imme-
diately be defeated once sufficiently many adversarial
samples are found.
5 Evaluation and Results
In this section, we test the defenses proposed by Xu et
al. [35] against 11 state-of-the-art attacks and one ad-
ditional adaptive attack [13]; subsequently, we show
how randomness can provide desirable security proper-
ties. The results demonstrate that Mix’n’Squeeze helps
in combating adversarial samples using key based ran-
domness in conjunction with deep learning defenses.
We show that randomness hardens Feature Squeezing
further by adding unpredictability to adversarial sam-
ples. Overall, the accuracy over legitimate samples is
decreased only slightly while the accuracy over adver-
sarial samples increases in most cases. This makes the
system more secure as the errors become unpredictable,
and thus decreases adversary’s the confidence. Before
presenting evaluation results, we introduce our setup.
5.1 Setup for Evaluating Mix’n’Squeeze
Attacks. We evaluate Mix’n’Squeeze against 11 state-
of-the-art attacks with 3 distance metrics and one ad-
ditional attack (adaptive w.r.t. Feature Squeezing) [13].
As proposed by Xu et al. [35], we analyze two varia-
tions of each targeted attack: (i) next: targets the class
next to the ground truth class modulo number of classes
(ii) least-likely (LL): targets the class which the image
is least-likely to be classified as. Specifically, we ana-
lyze Mix’n’Squeeze for the following attacks: Fast Gra-
dient Sign Method (FGSM) [10], Basic Iterative Method
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(BIM) [17], Carlini and Wagner L0, L2 and L∞ attacks
(CW) [6] (Next & LL), DeepFool [21], Jacobian Saliency
Map Approach (JSMA) [25] (Next & LL) and finally
an adaptive attack against Feature Squeezing by He et
al. [13].
Datasets. We use MNIST, CIFAR-10, ImageNet
datasets to conduct our experiments. These datasets
are widely used in the machine learning community and
also for adversarial learning research such as Feature
Squeezing [35] and MagNet [20]. MNIST is a dataset of
hand-written digits (0-9) encoded as 8-bits grayscale im-
ages of size 28×28 pixels (one color channel per pixel).
CIFAR-10 is a dataset of 32×32 pixel images with 24-
bit color per pixel (three color channels per pixel) and 10
classes. The ImageNet dataset contains 1.2 million im-
ages for training and 50 000 images for validation. They
are of various sizes and hand-labeled with 1000 classes.
The images are preprocessed to 224×224 pixels and en-
coded with 24-bit color per pixel.
Target models. The attacks are tested on pre-trained
state-of-the-art models as used in Feature Squeez-
ing [35]. We use a 7-layer CNN for MNIST4, a DenseNet
model for CIFAR-105 [16] and MobileNet [15] for Im-
ageNet with a top-1 accuracy of 99.43%, 94.84% and
68.36% respectively. The prediction performance of
these models is at par with best models6.
To study the benefits of introducing randomness, we
use the same data samples as used by Xu et al. [35]. We
use 100 adversarial samples for each of the 11 attacks for
all datasets. Each color channel of the pixel is normal-
ized to be in the range [0,1]. We use 10 000 legitimate
samples for MNIST and CIFAR-10 and 200 samples for
ImageNet (due to high computation cost) to study the
effect of adding randomness to the defenses.
Experimental setup. We evaluate the efficacy of the
3 defenses proposed by Xu et al. [35]—bit depth reduc-
tion, median smoothing and non-local smoothing, when
combined with randomness. We study each of the 11
attacks against the 3 defenses with varying parameters
for 3 datasets. The experiment is repeated 200 times
for each randomness level to compute the statistics. In
our evaluation, the accuracy over adversarial samples is
averaged over 200 runs and probability of each sample
being misclassified is also computed over 200 runs to
calculate the advantage for a given key length. We note
that for the deterministic case when no randomness is
added (δ = 0) the results do not change.
Implementation. We implemented Mix’n’Squeeze in
Python and executed it using CPython. Namely, we
4https://github.com/carlini/nn_robust_attacks/
5https://github.com/titu1994/DenseNet/
6http://rodrigob.github.io/are_we_there_yet/build/
classification_datasets_results.html
adapted the open source code released by Xu et al.7
to implement our solution. We use a machine with 3.5
GHz processor and 32 GB RAM for our experiments.
5.2 Results
In this section we present the results of our evaluation
under the setting described.
Choosing δ . Choosing the randomness magnitude δ
appropriately is vital to designing an effective defense.
The choice depends upon the nature of dataset and the
defense used. As we show in the paragraphs ahead the
behavior of defenses can vary for grayscale and color im-
ages. We study these variations extensively by running
experiments for changing δ . We present our evaluation
of MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets next.
5.2.1 MNIST.
Figure 4 shows the behavior of accuracy of the classifier
for both adversarial and legitimate samples as input ran-
domization (δ ) is increased. The accuracy decreases as
δ is increased. Squeezing via reducing bit-depth shows
a drastic drop in accuracy beyond a certain randomness
for most attacks; as δ increases, a larger fraction of pix-
els breach the quantization threshold which results in
them being flipped to 0 or 1 despite being very distant
earlier, this results in accuracy dropping sharply. The
CW0 adversarial samples show an improvement in ac-
curacy for high δ , this is due to large L0 perturbations
being undone due to noise. Median smoothing meth-
ods are less affected by large randomness values due
to the randomness being averaged out. Hence we ob-
serve a gradual decline in accuracy with increasing ran-
domness. The advantage (Advev-csaA∗,N,1(C$), cf. Equation 6)
curve shows more interesting behavior, for squeezing via
bit-depth reduction the advantage decreases for low val-
ues of δ but then rises sharply, we note that this tends
to happen at roughly same δ value. For large δ the
defense does not work and the adversary is always able
to discover samples which are misclassified. The chosen
application of randomization does not produce a pixel
such that all its values are equally likely (due to clip-
ping values outside the bounds), hence, high levels of
δ biases the classification of a sample causing repeated
misclassification, resulting in a rise in advantage. Me-
dian smoothing defenses show a more uniform behavior
with the advantage rising only at very large δ . We con-
clude that an appropriately chosen δ provides desirable
security properties, we found that δ = 0.2 for bit-depth
reduction and δ = 0.5 for median smoothing provides
the best trade-off between accuracy (adversarial and le-
gitimate samples) and advantage. We present the ac-
7https://github.com/mzweilin/EvadeML-Zoo
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Figure 4: MNIST: Behavior of accuracy and advantage of the adversary for δ = [0,0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5,0.6,0.7,0.8].
The advantage is computed for the number of chosen samples (N) set to 25. We also plot the accuracy of the model
for legitimate samples as δ increases (shown once for each defense as the curve does not change).
curacy values in Table 2. We note that the accuracy
decreases slightly over legitimate samples. For compar-
ison, Table 1 shows the accuracy of defenses when no
randomness is added [35]. We show the advantage only
for the number of chosen samples (N) set to 25, however,
the shape of the curve remains same for varying N and
is only shifted up or down the y-axis on decreasing or
increasing the N, hence the conclusions do not change.
Figure 5 shows the probabilities of the prediction er-
rors when used with 3×3 median smoothing with and
without randomness. Each row represents a specific at-
tack strategy A; the x-axis represents the adversarial
sample set XA (in particular |XA| = 100); the color in-
tensity of each cell indicates the estimated probability
(over the classifier’s randomness) that the correspond-
ing adversarial sample succeeds (note, this probabil-
ity is binary for a deterministic classifier). However,
when randomness is introduced the error probabilities
spread out for a large number of samples as they are
no longer deterministic. For each of the considered at-
tacks A, the empirical error over XA can be computed
by summing up the probabilities that each adversarial
sample in XA succeeds, i.e., errXA(C$) = ∑100i=1 1success ·
Pr [1success] = ∑100i=1Pr [C$(xi) 6= f (xi)]. For ease of presen-
tation, we only present the results applied to one defense
in order to to demonstrate the effect of randomness, the
results for other defenses are similar.
Figure 6 plots the advantage of the adversary for in-
creasing number of chosen samples (N) under varying
randomness (δ ). As the number of chosen samples in-
creases, it becomes harder for the adversary to fool the
system. We see that without randomness the advantage
shows binary behavior as the number of misclassifica-
tions and their probability remain constant and drop
to 0 as N increases (this confirms the theoretical pre-
dictions from Section 4.2). In contrast, the advantage
drops much more sharply when randomness is intro-
duces. The drop is not always consistent for bit-depth
squeezing due to errors increasing as discussed earlier.
However, advantage curve for δ = 0.2 is always below
the curve for δ = 0, clearly demonstrating that ran-
domness makes adversarial prediction harder. Similarly,
considering the drop in accuracy, the curve for δ = 0.5
provides an optimum trade-off for median smoothing.
5.2.2 CIFAR-10.
The results for running Mix’n’Squeeze within the
CIFAR-10 dataset are similar to MNIST: adding
randomness helps make misclassified samples unpre-
dictable. Note that CIFAR-10 has color and each pixel
has three color channels each of which are normalized
to [0,1]. We introduce randomness individually to each
channel for each pixel, hence the effect of randomness
becomes significant even at low δ values. Figure 7
(cf. Appendix A) shows that accuracy over both legiti-
mate and adversarial samples drops sharply on increas-
ing δ . The accuracy over adversarial samples improves
significantly at δ = 0.05 for almost all defenses with just
a small drop over legitimate samples. At δ = 0.05 the
drop in adversarial advantage is significant for almost
all attacks. These results are confirmed in Figure 8
(cf. Appendix A) where the advantage drops much more
sharply as number of chosen samples is increased at
δ = 0.05, hence we choose it as the optimum trade-off
point for accuracy vs. advantage for varying δ (cf. Ta-
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Figure 5: MNIST: Unpredictability of errors in for Median Smoothing (3× 3) defense, without randomness (top
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Figure 6: MNIST: Variation of adversarial advantage (Advev-csaA∗,N,1(C$), cf. Equation 6) as the number of chosen samples
is varied for different randomness magnitudes (δ ).
bles 1 & 2). Large values of δ make the classifier unus-
able as accuracy drops.
5.2.3 ImageNet
As seen in Figures 9 & 10 (cf. Appendix A), the results
of running Mix’n’Squeeze with the ImageNet dataset
are similar to MNIST and CIFAR-10. We present the
accuracy values in Tables 1 & 2. The behavior of ac-
curacy and advantage for the ImageNet dataset is sim-
ilar to that of CIFAR-10 (cf. Figures 7 & 8). Iden-
tical to our evaluation in the CIFAR-10 dataset, we
note that Mix’n’Squeeze introduces small randomness
for each color channel.
Interpretation of results. Increase in the magni-
tude of randomness drives the accuracy of the classi-
fier over legitimate samples towards 10% as classifica-
tion becomes akin to guessing (for classification over 10
classes as in MNIST and CIFAR-10). We made a de-
liberate choice to clip the pixel values when they go
outside the allowed bounds of [0,1] rather than wrap-
ping around. A value of δ = 1 and wrapping around
the pixel values when they go out of bounds produces
a truly random pixel, and hence the image. We found
that at this level of randomness, accuracy over legiti-
mate samples becomes close to 10%. Even lower values
of δ produce a sharp drop in accuracy over legitimate
samples, hence we choose to clip the values when they
go out of bounds. Our primary motivation is to per-
turb the pixels in a manner which subsumes the adver-
sarial perturbation and to which the adversary cannot
adapt while keeping the usefulness of the classifier in-
tact. The optimum magnitude of randomness δ to be
used is contingent on the defense used. High values of
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Table 1: Accuracy of original Feature Squeezing defenses without randomness (δ = 0) over adversarial samples (%).
Xu et al. [35] omit DeepFool on MNIST as the adversarial samples generated appear unrecognizable to humans;
non-local smoothing is not applied to MNIST as it is hard to find similar patches on such images for smoothing a
center patch. JSMA is omitted for ImageNet due to large memory requirement.
Dataset
Squeezer L∞ Attacks L2 Attacks L0 Attacks
All Attacks Legitimate
Name Parameters FGSM BIM
CW∞ DeepFool
CW2 CW0 JSMA
Next LL Next LL Next LL Next LL
MNIST
None 54 9 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 27 40 13.00 99.43
Bit Depth 1-bit 92 87 100 100 - 83 66 0 0 50 49 62.70 99.33
Median Smoothing
2×2 61 16 70 55 - 51 35 39 36 62 56 48.10 99.28
3×3 59 14 43 46 - 51 53 67 59 82 79 55.30 98.95
CIFAR-10
None 15 8 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.27 94.84
Bit Depth
5-bit 17 13 12 19 40 40 47 0 0 21 17 20.55 94.55
4-bit 21 29 69 74 72 84 84 7 10 23 20 44.82 93.11
Median Smoothing 2×2 38 56 84 86 83 87 83 88 85 84 76 77.27 89.29
Non-local Means 11-3-4 27 46 80 84 76 84 88 11 11 44 32 53.00 91.18
ImageNet
None 1 0 0 0 11 10 3 0 0 - - 2.78 69.70
Bit Depth
5-bit 2 0 33 60 21 68 66 7 18 - - 30.56 69.40
4-bit 5 4 66 79 44 84 82 38 67 - - 52.11 68.00
Median Smoothing
2×2 22 28 75 81 72 81 84 85 85 - - 68.11 65.40
3×3 33 41 73 76 66 77 79 81 79 - - 67.22 62.10
Non-local Means 11-3-4 10 25 77 82 57 87 86 43 47 - - 57.11 65.40
Table 2: Accuracy of Mix’n’Squeeze (%). Bold values indicate an improvement over corresponding values in Table 1.
Dataset
Squeezer L∞ Attacks L2 Attacks L0 Attacks
All Attacks Legitimate
Name Parameters FGSM BIM
CW∞ DeepFool
CW2 CW0 JSMA
Next LL Next LL Next LL Next LL
MNIST
Bit Depth
(δ = 0.2) 1-bit 88.98 84.06 98.37 98.26 - 77.44 63.19 1.39 0.42 49.26 48.41 60.98 99.31
Median Smoothing
(δ = 0.5)
2×2 54.78 25.53 50.70 40.22 - 52.20 42.21 40.65 28.27 58.15 54.05 44.68 97.54
3×3 58.03 27.61 58.53 52.87 - 61.27 55.40 56.86 48.78 77.23 71.67 56.83 97.99
CIFAR-10
Bit Depth
(δ = 0.05)
5-bit 27.33 47.27 71.75 70.89 69.91 76.90 75.06 26.21 23.89 29.84 22.06 49.19 85.03
4-bit 30.70 51.34 68.89 67.29 67.55 72.95 71.08 30.25 26.60 29.36 22.14 48.92 81.27
Median Smoothing
(δ = 0.05) 2×2 47.66 66.23 83.59 85.90 83.70 84.45 86.50 85.61 86.11 78.54 73.62 78.36 86.80
Non-local Means
(δ = 0.05) 11-3-4 35.27 61.19 88.59 89.39 86.31 91.01 90.52 22.08 24.21 44.05 33.80 60.58 90.90
ImageNet
Bit Depth
(δ = 0.1)
5-bit 34.86 54.97 76.97 79.50 70.73 79.45 80.31 67.52 67.43 - - 67.97 63.00
4-bit 35.63 56.11 76.66 78.92 70.91 79.11 79.69 67.40 66.48 - - 67.88 61.00
Median Smoothing
(δ = 0.1)
2×2 53.44 62.49 69.11 69.09 67.22 70.13 69.97 68.47 68.20 - - 66.46 57.00
3×3 52.23 58.88 63.76 63.88 62.87 64.46 63.91 63.76 64.22 - - 62.00 52.50
Non-local Means
(δ = 0.1) 11-3-4 32.53 55.29 78.97 81.28 72.92 81.11 81.52 66.02 68.71 - - 68.71 64.50
δ have strong effect on the accuracy when used in con-
junction with bit depth reduction, as it could change
the value of a pixel drastically if the bit depth is low.
In contrast, methods like local and non-local smoothing
are much more resilient to high δ , as they average out
the noise from sections of images. The noise that we
add, being additive, is filtered out. Note that we want
to use the largest value of δ possible so as to subsume
the adversarial perturbations while still maintaining the
accuracy. Not all defenses are equally potent for all at-
tacks and datasets hence δ must be carefully chosen.
Mix’n’Squeeze can mitigate the limitation of a weak de-
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fense to some extent, as seen in case of CIFAR-10 bit
depth (5-bit) defense where the accuracy over adversar-
ial samples increases by almost 2.5 times. However, effi-
cacy of defense is critical to have any success in general,
and randomness alone cannot help.
5.2.4 Semi-adaptive attacks
He et al. [13] presented an adaptive attack specifically
on Feature Squeezing. The attack is a modified version
of that proposed by Carlini and Wagner [6] and finds
adversarial samples which remain adversarial even after
feature squeezing is applied.
Table 3: Accuracy of the He et al. [13] attack with and
without Mix’n’Squeeze (the values in the brackets are
where Mix’n’Squeeze is not used). The statistics were
computed after 20 attack iterations.
Non-Adversarial
Accuracy (%)
Adversarial
Accuracy (%)
Bit Depth 1-bit
(δ = 0.2) 100±0 (100) 96.05±1.61 (1.00)
Median Smoothing 2×2
(δ = 0.5) 96.35±1.42 (100) 70.20±4.48 (0.00)
Median Smoothing 3×3
(δ = 0.5) 94.00±2.29 (100) 73.75±3.99 (0.00)
To evaluate the effectiveness of Mix’n’Squeeze against
this attack, we executed the attack using various squeez-
ing techniques on 100 samples of the MNIST dataset
(as chosen in et al. [13]). We embedded Mix’n’Squeeze
only to the function which squeezes the inputs. As seen
in Table 3, the randomness exhibited by Mix’n’Squeeze
results in a marginal loss in classification accuracy of
non-adversarial samples and in a considerable boost in
the accuracy of adversarial samples for all the squeezing
techniques. In particular, for δ = 0.2 (bit-depth reduc-
tion) and δ = 0.5 (median smoothing), Mix’n’Squeeze
improves the classification accuracy of non-adversarial
samples from 0% to over 95% and 70% respectively.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this work, we argue that secure defenses for deep
learning should make it hard for an attacker to predict
the success of adversarial samples. We present a secu-
rity model to formalize robustness to adversarial sam-
ples and capture this notion of unpredictability in a rig-
orous way. We also propose a novel defensive technique,
Mix’n’Squeeze, that specifically targets unpredictability
by introducing random noise to the input. Our tech-
nique can be flexibly included as a pre-processing step to
existing classifiers, and in particular it can be combined
with other defenses. We evaluate an instantiation of
our proposal, combined with feature squeezing, against
state-of-the-art blackbox (i.e., non adaptive) and gray-
box (i.e., semi-adaptive) attacks. Our benchmark re-
sults show that Mix’n’Squeeze can enhance the security
of machine learning algorithms in a graybox model at
minimal drop in accuracy over legitimate samples. We
do not evaluate the robustness of Mix’n’Squeeze against
whitebox (i.e., fully adaptive) attacks.
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A Further Evaluation Results
We provide further evaluation results for the accuracy on adversarial samples and corresponding advantage
of Mix’n’Squeeze, for the CIFAR-10 dataset (Figures 7 and 8), and for the ImageNet dataset (Figures 9 and 10).
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Figure 7: CIFAR-10: Behavior of accuracy and advantage of the adversary for magnitudes of randomness δ =
[0,0.05,0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5]. The advantage is computed for the 50 chosen samples. We also plot the accuracy of the
model for legitimate samples as δ increases (shown once for each defense as the curve does not change).
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Figure 8: CIFAR-10: Variation of adversarial advantage as the number of chosen samples is varied for different
randomness magnitudes (δ ).
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Figure 9: ImageNet: Behavior of accuracy and advantage of the adversary for magnitudes of randomness δ =
[0,0.05,0.1,0.2,0.3]. The advantage is computed for the 50 chosen samples. We also plot the accuracy of the model
for legitimate samples as δ increases (shown once for each defense as the curve does not change).
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Figure 10: ImageNet: Variation of adversarial advantage as the number of chosen samples is varied for different
randomness magnitudes (δ ).
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